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TALKING ABOUT TALKING ABOUT 'FEUDALISM' 
Edmund Leach 
The published reports of academic conferences bear an uncertain 
relationship to the events which they record. If the Conference 
goes well it is the proceedings as such, the active face to face 
discussion and debate, which matter for the participants; the 
conference is remembered as a unity; the individual papers seem 
secondary and are quickly forgotten. 
But published symposia have quite a different value. The 
contributed papers (as revised) exist as isolates to be consulted, 
one at a time, without reference to the context with which they 
were originally associated. Should I therefore address myself 
to my fellow conferees or to the outside reader who was not in 
at the start? 
My own role was dual. I contributed an opening paper about 
Hydraulic Society which got things started though subsequently 
we never returned to my opening theme. I was also a general 
'discussant' and had the special task of producing an off-the-cuff 
summing up at the end. What follows is a mixture of these two 
disparate types of contribution but I will give them in reverse 
order. I will start with a sort of summing up and then give a version 
of my original paper. 
Most certainly the Conference as a whole did 'go well'. In 
response to active editorial encouragement from Mukherjee and 
his colleagues the paper readers were unusually obedient to the 
standard instruction that scripts should be available for advance 
circulation. This had a very beneficial effect on the quality of 
the verbal discussion. 
The prime purpose of the Sydney Association for Studies in 
Society and Culture is to build bridges across the demarcation 
lines which isolate individual Faculties and Departments. The 
liveliness of the debate showed that that objective had been 
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achieved. The members of the Association should be well satisfied 
with their endeavours. But not surprisingly other demarcation 
lines came to the surface. 
Since the Conference had been designed to pivot around the 
question o.f just how far the European historical category 'Feudalism' 
and the 'Ur-Marxist' category 'The Asiatic Mode of Production' 
fit in with the concerns of contemporary historians of 'pre-colonial' 
Asia, it was predictable that there would be major divisions of 
opinion between 'empiricists' and 'ideologists' and between 'Marxists' 
and 'non-Marxists'. The line of battle was not drawn up on Faculty 
or Departmental lines; indeed many of the participants took up 
a dissident stance somewhere in the middle ground, sniping away 
happily at both sides; but doctrinal fundamentals of this kind did 
lead to a good deal of misunderstanding. 
It was also predictable that we should not arrive at specifiable 
'conclusions'. At an empirical level the documentation just didn't 
add up. The conference was presented with a string of thumbnail 
accounts of the social and political structures of a rag-bag of 
pre-industrial Asian societies, large and small, ancient and modern, 
together with a rag-bag of disputable generalisations about the 
actualities and ideologies of social and political structures in 
parts of rural Western Europe between the 6th and 14th Centuries 
A.D. Most of the latter group of papers purported to be about 
'European Feudalism' but there was clearly no general consensus 
as to what the term feudalism should be held to mean. So the 
question of whether the Asian examples were similar or dissimilar 
to the European model came to depend upon arbitrary decisions 
about definition. If it were not for the fact that 'feudalism' and 
its Asian vernacular equivalents have acquired the loaded value 
of political sloga.ns no one could reasonably have expected that 
the total congeries of case histories would throw up anything 
of general as distinct from particular interest. 
Moreover the fact that the word 'feudalism' appeared in the 
title of the conference distorted parts of our' discussion in other 
ways. Each of us had his or her private definition of what the 
word means and the commentator who complained that whatever 
might be the merits or limitations of Philip Barker's paper about 
the politics of primogeniture 'it had nothing to do with feudalism' 
was doubtless perfectly justified in terms of his own verbal usage. 
But if, as some of us had supposed, our ultimate empirical concern 
was with the factors that are necessary for, or conducive to, the 
transition from pre-industrial to industrial social organisation 
then the possibility of capital accumulation either in land or any 
other form of assets must be a key factor. And here the rules 
of inheritance and patterns of marriage alliance are absolutely 
central, regardless of whether the enveloping society is properly 
described as 'feudal' or not. 
Our discussions of the role of ideology were rather better 
focussed though an early suggestion from myself that since Marxist 
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categories are components in a dialectical argument they ought 
to be viewed in paired opposition: feudalism versus capitalism, 
feudalism versus slavery, was ignored, as also was Bruce Kapferer's 
repeated suggestion that Weberian theory was at least as relevant 
for our discussions as are Marx's scrappy notes about pre-capitalist 
modes of production. 
Let me pick up that theme again. One reason why debates 
among Marxists are so confused is that, for political reasons, 
the full corpus of Marx's writings did not become available until 
long after his death. Similarly, admirers of Max Weber tend to 
forget that most of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft was still unpublished 
at the time of his death and that, apart from The Protestant Ethic, 
most of the Weberian corpus which we now possess is a 
reconstruction by his various editors. The name of Karl Marx 
does not appear very often in the Weberian corpus and one needs 
to delve quite deep to appreciate that for much of the time Weber 
was engaged in a debate with Marx's ghost. 
But just as arguments about the canonical status of the 
Grundrisse and of "The Asiatic Mode of Production" need not 
deter us from learning from Marx, so also the criticisms of the 
historical empiricists need not deter us from reading Weber. 
So let me remind you of certain bits of the story. Horrified 
by the empirical realities of the mid-19th Century Lancashire 
textile industry, to which he had· been introduced by Engels, Marx 
tended to see the alienation from his society of the 'free' individual 
wage-earning labourer as lying at the very core of "the Capitalist 
Mode of Production" for it was only if labourers were competing 
as individuals in a 'free' labour market that the entrepreneur 
industrialist would be able to force wages down to the level of 
bare subsistence and rip off the surplus for himself. 
This is 'vulgar Marxism' and there is more to the story than 
that, but Marx's concern with feudalism was essentially negative. 
Feudalism was a state of society in which labour was not free 
in the market economy sense but in which the seed of such a 'free 
market economy' were already embedded. Historiography was 
still in its infancy. Marx's 'feudalism' was a very hypothetical 
system. 
Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
the earliest version of which appeared in the form of two articles 
published in 1904/5, does not mention Marx, yet, in part, it is 
clearly a response to Marx's argument about the origins of the 
free labour market. Weber suggeste j that we should not look 
for these origins in the decay of a (largely imaginary) feudal order 
but in the historical circumstances of the 16th/17th Century 
efflorescence of the Calvinist ethic. 
This inexplicit dialectical response of Weber to Marx was not 
unlike the dialectic of our Sydney conference. In effect Weber 
attacked Marx for his ill informed empiricism and his failure to 
recognise that ideology can be a driving force in social development. 
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And I too feel that Marx, despite his Hegelian background, was 
far too committed to positivist assumptions. The determinist 
laws of historical development were to be discovered in the 
structure of physical relationships between labourers and land 
rather than in the metaphysical relationships posited by a particular 
religious context. 
But in our conference the argument went the other way. By 
and large it was the Marxists (and near Marxists) who attacked 
the non-Marxists for their aimless descriptive empiricism while 
at the same time proclaiming the importance of ideological 
categories (borrowed in this case from the language of European 
Marxism) for understanding contemporary developments in the 
Asiatic political arena. I find this inversion curious and perhaps 
ironic! 
But let me get back to Max Weber and Bruce Kapferer's 
intervention about ideal types. 
Ideal type models need to be unambiguous and should be 
presented as sets of contrasted categories. 
That said, we need to distinguish between models which are 
introduced by the social historian, anthropologist, or what have 
you, to clarify his/her own thinking and models which the analyst 
perceives to be operating as a conscious ideology in the field under 
observation. Both varieties of model are present in Weber's writings 
and this was true also of the contributed papers of our conference. 
Weber's 'rational bureaucracy', which derives its legitimacy from 
above, is an example of the former; Michael Roberts' 'Asokan 
persona' is an example of the latter. One of the more illuminating 
facts to emerge from our discussions was that in several parts 
of contemporary Asia a local 'folk model', now described as 
'feudalism' by local Marxists but not in reality in the least like 
European feudalism in its. conventional Marxist sense, operates 
as a primary driving force in contemporary politics. 
This process by which the language of Marxism is used to force 
very un-European political facts into the mould of a quite fictitious 
Marxist ideal type ['European Feudalism'] provides much food 
for thought both for the historian and for the anthropologist. I 
can speak only for the latter. 
The first dogma of social anthropology is that cultural systems 
are enormously diverse. The first dogma of orthodox Marxism 
is just the reverse. 
Tacitly the general title of our symposium seemed to accept 
the Marxist proposition that human society evolved through a 
very limited sequence of stages in unilinear progression and that 
the stage immediately preceding world wide 'Capitalism' is an 
equally world wide phenomenon 'Feudalism'. 
As an anthropologist I cannot accept any such thesis. There 
have been hundreds, perhaps thousands, of quite different social 
and political structures which deserve the title 'pre-industrial 
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society'. If this diversity is squeezed into a single category 
'Feudalism', the category becomes redundant. It loses all connection 
with the historical feudalism of Mediaeval Europe (insofar as 
there was any such unitary system). The many 'feudalisms' thus 
specified have nothing in common except that they are 
pre-industrial. 
The second dogma of social anthropology is that social 
phenomena take on meaning only when viewed in context. This 
poses difficulties when social anthropologists endeavour to enter 
into debate with historians because the data of history, - mainly 
documents and archaeological residues-, always lack their original 
context. 
The symposium contributions provided an excellent example 
of what I mean. The specialists in Western European history had 
all read the same documents. They made radically different guesses 
about the contexts from which these documents had emerged. 
As a result they arrived at radically different conclusions as to 
how the documents should be interpreted. In the process the 
starting point of the discussion, the concept of 'feudalism' as a 
universal, tended to disappear. 
Several of the original papers, e.g. those by John Ward, Soumyen 
Mukherjee and Craig Reynolds, faced up to these difficulties which 
present us with a paradox. On the one hand it is clear that in 
empirical terms the traditional model of Western Feudalism is 
a figment of the imagination created by Mediaeval Lawyers and 
post-17th century historians. On the other hand, while 'feudalism' 
may be a myth, Australia is surrounded by ·developing nations 
in which "Marxists are waging battles, most of the time successfully, 
against colonialism and feudalism"! 
So what is the empirical content of the ideological figment 
against which real life Marxists wage their political battles? Does 
the expression 'colonialism and· feudalism' signify anything more 
than a convenient verbal parallelism? Does 'feudalism' here mean 
anything at all other than 'pre-colonial' or 'pre-industrial'? 
It is from this point of view that my own opening paper may 
be considered to have had some relevance to our later discussions. 
My contribution was not, like most of the others, a critique 
of some version (either Marxist or non-Marxist) of the concept 
of 'feudalism' but it was (in an indirect and round about fashion) 
a critique of another closely related, but dialectically opposed 
Marxist category 'The Asiatic Mode of Production'. 
As Mukherjee shows, the intellectual debate about the nature 
of feudalism developed in parallel with a complementary debate 
about whether centralised government was a road to greater 
freedom or a vehicle to exploitative despotism. 
In Marxist argument, despotism is associated with The Asiatic 
Mode of Production and, particularly in Wittfogel's anti-Marxist 
exegesis, with something called Hydraulic Society. 
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In Marx's own set of categories the Asiatic Mode of Production 
differed from his other ideal type models of pre-Capitalist modes 
in that it did not contain fundamental internal contradictions. 
Consequently, it was not self-destructive. It therefore fits badly 
with any historicist scheme which assumes a deterministic 'law' 
of inevita!:>le evolution towards either Capitalism or the socialist 
utopia which was destined to emerge from Marxist/Leninist type 
revolutions. 
I will go on from there. 
As must already be apparent, I am highly sceptical about the 
utility of all grand. scale categories. The Committed Marxist 
can no doubt manage to fit almost every conceivable type of social 
system into one or other of a set of five boxes labelled: 'primitive 
communism', 'slavery', 'feudalism', 'capitalism', 'Asiatic mode 
of production' but at the end of the day the empirical systems 
that will have found their way into any single box will turn out 
to have very little in common. 
However, in present circumstances I cannot avoid using the 
term 'feudalism' so I must explain how I am using it. 
The English edition of Marc Bloch's major synthesis, Feudal 
Society, has a Foreword by the late Munia Postan which, in effect, 
warns us to be cautious. Postan notes that the main tradition 
in European writing about Feudalism has been to equate it with 
the mediaeval Latin concept of feudum. That would imply that 
the beginning and end of Feudalism is in the service of a knight 
to his overlord and that the whole framework is strictly military. 
Postan notes that Bloch goes far beyond such limitation. It is 
clear that, up to a point, Postan approves of Bloch's expanded 
.usage but at the same time he emphasises the difficulties that 
this entails. For if Feudalism is not restricted to military 
relationships how is it to be limited at all? What is NOT Feudalism? 
Towards the end of Volume 2 Bloch makes his case for the 
Marxist thesis that Feudalism was a 'stage' in the development 
of .pre-industrial society which was of world-wide occurrence. 
As Postan noted, Feudalism is made to embrace most of the 
significant features of mediaeval European society. But if there 
is a direct equation by which 'Feudal Society = European Mediaeval 
Society', then those, who follow Bloch, in holding that the category 
Feudalism can be usefully applied to pre-industrial Asiatic social 
systems, ought to be explicit as to how far they are also asserting 
that Mediaeval European Society and Mediaeval Asiatic Society 
were identical. For if they were not identical but only similar 
'in certain respects', where do the crucial differences lie? Here 
is the passage in question: 
[Bloch is specifying the characteristics of Feudalism as 
he understands it]. "A subject peasantry; widespread use 
of the service tenement (i.e. the fief) instead of a salary, 
which was out of the question; the supremacy of a class 
of specialized warriors; ties of obedience and protection 
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which bind man to man and, within the warrior class, assume 
the distinctive form called vassalage; fragmentation of 
authority - leading inevitably to disorder: and, in the midst 
of all this, the survival of other forms of association, family 
and State, of which the latter, during the second feudal 
age, was to acquire renewed strength - such then seem 
to be the fundamental features of European feudalism. 
Like all the phenomena revealed by that science of eternal 
change which is history, the social structure thus 
characterized certainly bore the peculiar stamp of an age 
and an environment. Yet just as the matrilineal or agnatic 
clan or even certain types of economic enterprise are found 
in much the same forms in very different societies, it is 
by no means impossible that societies different from our 
own should have passed through a phase closely resembling 
that which has just been defined. If so, it is legitimate 
to call them feudal during that phase. [Bloch (1961: II: 
446)] 
As can be seen everything really turns on just what is meant by 
saying that a particular type of social institution, which Bloch 
here exemplifies by 'the matrilineal or agnatic clan' has the same 
form in very different societies. What is meant by 'the same'? 
What is meant by 'different'? 
It is a fact of history that Marx himself, at any rate during 
his early period, held, that the Asiatic States had not conformed 
to his simplistic evolutionary scheme. Feudalism had NOT been 
a stage in their development. The Asiatic Mode of Production 
was different. However, the later Marxists, for complex political 
reasons, have mostly rejected this distinction, so that pre-Industrial 
India, China, Sri Lanka and the rest are regularly described as 
'feudal'. Wittfogel on the other hand defended Marx's early 
distinction and supplemented it by asserting that there is a specific 
link between the Asiatic Mode of Production and large scale 
irrigation, and that this results in a despotic centralised state 
rather than the fragmented decentralisation that Bloch asserted 
to be one of the characteristics of European feudalism. 
Although this theoretical argument about universals is 
somewhere in the background of what I am going to say it is not 
at all central to my argument. I am interested in the facts on 
the ground. Where the historians cite documents as evidence 
I shall give you thumb-nail ethnographic descriptions of systems 
of irrigation which I have observed in operation at first hand. 
I am interested in how socio-economic systems work at a very 
small scale local level. It is the differences between one localised 
cultural system and another which I find remarkable rather than 
any overall similarity. 
Those who are happy to apply the term Feudalism to 
pre-industrial Asiatic societies mostly fasten on the criterion 
of service tenure of land. Likewise those who want to draw a 
Talking about Feudalism 13 
clear cut distinction between Capitalist and pre-Capitalist modes 
-of production are likely to make wage labour a critical hallmark 
of Capitalism. 
Now it is certainly true that approximate analogues of Mediaeval 
European feudal service tenure of land can be found in many parts 
of the world. It is also true that, in terms of real time chronology, 
straight forward wage labour developed rather late. So if we 
use these two isolated factors to define (i) Feudalism and (ii) 
Capitalism then Feudalism was antecedent to Capitalism though 
there is no necessary causal relationship between the two modes 
of social organisation and anyway Capitalism, as we now understand 
it, is not specified by the single criterion of wage labour. Moreover 
even if service tenure is a necessary feature of any system that 
is to be labelled 'Feudalism' we need to recognise that there are 
many different kinds of service tenure. Some of them are to 
be encountered in industrial as well as pre-industrial society and 
they may relate to tenures of other kinds besides the tenure of 
land. The offices held by clergymen of the Church of England 
and by the Fellows of Oxford and Cambridge Colleges are cases 
in point. 'Relics of Feudalism' no doubt, but such people are living 
in the 20th Century and the capitalist tax authorities treat them 
as such. 
But if the borderline between Feudalism and Capitalism is 
indistinct where should the even vaguer concept of Hydraulic 
Society be fitted in? 
The organised cultivation of crops and the aggregatio.n of 
population into permanent settlements seems to have got going 
somewhere between 10 and 12,000 years ago. We do not know 
why. The changeover from a hunter-gatherer economy to a 
horticultural economy was not, in any obvious way, a marker of 
human progress. From a dietary and health point of view this 
much vaunted Neolithic Revolution must have lead to a decline 
of living standards not an improvement. The nutritional rewards 
per man-hour of labour would have been reduced. Perhaps rising 
population and shortage of game provided the motivating force. 
The archaeologists have now demonstrated that drainage and 
irrigation were associated with some of the very earliest forms 
of horticulture. This is an important point. Modern Europeans, 
Americans and Australians live in conditions where water supplies 
are normally reasonably adequate; neither grossly in excess nor 
grossly deficient. Where there is a worry it is usually because 
there is too much water rather than too little. Irrigation, where 
it is used at all, is a sophisticated specialisation, an addition to 
dry agriculture which is the norm. In the tropics things developed 
just the other way round: dry agriculture was a specialised 
development from wet agriculture and the techniques of irrigation 
were not really distinguishable from techniques of drainage; 
drainage came first. 
The development of rice cultivation technology in South-East 
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Asia provides an example. The sequence of development was 
almost certainly: (i) the cultivation of some variety of wild rice 
in undrained swamps; (ii) the cultivation of diverse varieties of 
domesticated rice in natural swampland which was both drained 
and irrigated; (iii) the cultivation of dry hill rice by slash and 
burn techniques, the dry rice varieties being mutants of wet 
varieties; (iv) the cultivation of wet rice in artificially constructed 
terraces fed by a full scale artificial irrigation system. Many 
different versions of all these alternatives are still in use. 
Certainly we need to distinguish the technology of flood plain 
agriculture from terraced agriculture, and fixed agriculture from 
shifting (slash and burn) agriculture, and wet cultivation from 
dry cultivation, and so on, but it is an error to suppose that, in 
situations of modest population density, any particular mode of 
agriculture is always more efficient than any other. The different 
techniques are not associated with an evolutionary sequence of 
distinct types of social organisation and if we are concerned at 
all with the empirical facts which underlie Marxist rhetoric this 
diversity of possibilities must surely be important. 
Nearly all the present day indigenous peoples of South East 
Asia practice several different forms of farming whenever they 
have the land and water resources to do so. Some of the 'most 
primitive' peoples (as conventionally recognised by 
non-anthropologists) - such as. the head-hunting Ifugao in the 
Philippines - are among the most efficient irrigation experts in 
the world. The precipitous hillsides of the country in which they 
live have been carved into vast areas of irrigated terracing which 
constitute, to use Wittfogel's phrase, 'a mammoth hydraulic 
construction', but the form of lfugao social organisation bears 
no relationship whatsoever to Wittfogel's fable of Oriental 
Despotism. Indeed these people are notable for the aggressive 
independence of each individual farming homestead. Needless 
to say Wittfogel ignored their existence though the irrigation 
system in question was well known long before Wittfogel wrote 
his book. 
For my present purposes the distinctive feature of Feudalism 
is service tenure in land. Lordship over land is ordered in a 
hierarchy. The actual worker of the land is not paid wages but 
pays 'rent' in the form of various kinds of service and/or products 
in kind to an overlord who in turn holds his lordship in fief to an 
overlord on similar terms. Characteristically there is no direct 
link between the King at the summit of the pyramid and the farmer 
at the bottom. It is also characteristic that there are no 
bureaucrats or military personel who stand outside the hierarchy 
of lordship under the direct control of the centre. No actual system 
ever worked like that but the model will suffice for present 
purposes. 
My model for Oriental Despotism is classical China rather 
than classical India. The King at the centre has absolute 
Talking about Feudalism 15 
untrammelled authority in all respects. The King exercises coercion 
by the use of military forces which are under direct control of 
the centre. The system is financed by direct taxation on the holders 
of the land. The system is administered by an elite, literate, 
bureaucracy which owes responsibility directly to the centre and 
not· to any local political overlord. Here again I am fully aware 
that no actual system ever worked quite like that. I have simply 
provided you with two contrasted models, Feudalism and Oriental 
Despotism, considered as ideal types. 
Hydraulic Society is Wittfogel's term. It seems to have been 
developed from a simplistic interpretation of what was known 
about the major early urban civilisations in the middle of the 
last century. 
It was then widely believed that sophisticated civilisation 
had begun in a variety of rather similar but, at first sight, rather 
improbable terrains: flat arid plains which could only yield crops 
if they were irrigated. The stock examples were the Nile valley, 
the Tigris-Euphrates valley, the Yellow River in Northern China, 
the Indus Valley in what is now Pakistan. Wittfogel's thesis was 
that the irrigation systems concerned would only be workable 
if they were centrally controlled. He assumed that centralised 
control of the irrigation system would automatically result in 
centralised control of the political system as well. To quote 
Wittfogel: 
"As manager of hydraulic and other mammoth constructions, 
the hydraulic sta,te prevents the non-governmental forces 
of society from crystallizing into independent bodies strong 
enough to counterbalance and control the political machine." 
[Wittfogel (1957: 49)] 
It seems logical. But does the formula square with the empirical 
evidence? What could rate as a fair test of such a proposition? 
How big does a 'mammoth construction' have to be before the 
principle begins to operate? 
The first extensive irrigation system which I encountered on 
the ground was in Szechwan in West China. It seemed to have 
most of the ingredients of the Wittfogel formula and was certainly 
an engineering marvel. In the remote geological past the central 
part of Szechwan Province was a sort of lunar crater. It is now 
a fertile plain about 100 miles by 80 miles with a ring of steep 
mountains all round the edge. A perceptive European visitor at 
the end of the last century described it as: "the richest plain in 
China, and possibly in the world.... It produces three and even 
four crops a year" (Bishop [1899: 343]). The elaborate network 
of canals and water channels which criss-cross the area, sometimes 
overlapping each other like the roadways in a motorway intersection 
are almost entirely man-made. Most of them have been in existence 
for well over two thousand years. 
The irrigation system starts in the north-west corner of the 
plain at Kuan Hsien and is supposed to have been constructed 
16 Feudalism 
by Li Ping, a prefect in the ancient kingdom of Shu, and his son, 
known to tradition as 'the second gentleman'. The essence of 
the system is that the Min river, a substantial tributary to the 
Yangtze, is diverted each March so as to feed into the main channels 
of the irrigation network. Each November the river is switched 
back again to its normal course. When the water dries out, the 
silt, which is about six feet deep, is dug from the main channels 
and spread over the land. The correct level at which to dig out 
the silt is marked by iron stakes sunk into the bed of the stream. 
Carved in the rock above the switching point at Kuan Hsien 
is a motto which in translation reads: "Dig the ditches deep; keep 
the banks low". Provided everyone adheres to this rule all the 
levels will be correct and there will be no flooding. I am not sure 
how things are working now, but in the days of the Empire there 
was a special bureaucracy responsible for the water works in charge 
of a Prefect of the Waterways (Shui Li Fu). This system was still 
operating unscathed in 1933 though all other aspects of Szechwanese 
politics were in chaos. 
Clearly the Shui Li Fu was a man of great influence to whom 
the politicians paid respect. But there does not seem to have 
been any period during the past 2000 years when he assumed the 
political role which Wittfogel's theory seems to require. The 
Prefect remained a bureaucrat; he did not become a despot in 
his own person. Since the literature concerning this massive 
Szechwanese system is extensive and easily accessible I find it 
very strange that, so far as I can discover, it is never mentioned 
by Wittfogel at all. If such a thing as an 'hydraulic society' has 
ever existed anywhere as a special form of socio-technical 
organisation it surely ought to be found in an environment such 
as this. 
All the rice growing areas of China, and that means most of 
the more southerly parts of that vast country, are dependent upon 
a combination of drainage and irrigation but usually the unit of 
control is much smaller than in the central Szechwan case. A 
common pattern is that the whole of a substantial valley, which 
originally provided the run-off feeding a single natural stream, 
is laid out in gently falling terraced fields from top to bottom. 
The original terracing was probably cumulative over a long period 
but it represents in total the investment of a huge expenditure 
of human labour and even the annual repairs to the terrace banks 
may call for complex coordinated labour organisation. In such 
circumstances it seems logical to suppose that some form of 
centralised management would be essential if those who work 
the lower fields are not to suffer damage either by water shortage 
or water excess because of the mal-functioning of sluices higher 
up. But coordination of effort does not imply despotic rule; various 
kinds of cooperative are also possible. There does not seem to 
have been any standard pattern in the way such systems were 
worked. 
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In pre-communist China the ultimate owners of the land were 
very often absentee 'gentry' landlords living in cities. Such landlords 
were parasitic and investment in land improvement does not seem 
to have been a normal pattern. The rent extracted from the tenant 
farmers varied from year to year and was pushed to extortionate 
limits. Officialdom levied tax on the landlords rather than the 
tenants; in return the lanlords could call on the support of the 
police to obtain payment of rent. 
Management was left to the local farmers. We know that 
in some areas the farmer households of a single village community 
would normally all have the same surname. In such cases irrigation 
control was organised on a lineage basis and enforced by the use 
of religious sanctions derived from the ancestor cult. But elsewhere 
the irrigation system seems to have been run by cooperatives 
organised through associations of local farmers without the backing 
of kinship ties and religious ·sanctions. Different versions of such 
cooperatives for different parts of China have been described 
by Fei and Kulp. Fei for the Yangtze delta; Kulp for a locality 
near Swatow. 
Fei's account provides a variation of tlhe share and share alike 
labour organisation which is widespread throughout South and 
South East Asia. Some of the key details of .the system he describes 
are as follows: 
1) This is an area where the farm land is above the level of the 
local river levels so that water has to be pumped to a higher level 
before it runs over the fields. 
2) Fei describes the operation of a field area which in 1935 provided 
employment for about 50 labouret·s: "The common trench opens 
on to the stream at the north margin. At the opening there are 
fifteen pumping spots. Each pump requires three workers. The 
amount of labour contributed by each household is proportional 
to the land holding of that household •••• The households of the 
community are organised into fifteen teams corresponding to 
the fifteen pumps. Each year one household in each group is 
responsible for providing and maintaining the pumping machinery 
for that group and for providing a group manager. This function 
rotaates by turn each year from one household to the next. One 
of the 15 group managers is appointed chief manager and he has 
the crucial authority to order the starting or stopping of pumping". 
Fei implies that this office als€>· rotates but I suspect this was 
a mistake. "When the chief manager has given his orders for the 
day the individual pump managers go around their group of 
households and summon their laborers by beating a gong. If any 
one of the three individuals thus scheduled for duty does not turn 
up within half an hour the other two could go along to the local 
village shop and order a supply of wine and fancy food which would 
be charged to the defaulter's account. If the manager has failed 
to summon the defaulter in proper manner the manager can be 
treated likewise". [Fei (1930: Ch. 1 0)] 
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This is all tiny scale stuff, but Fei implies that there was no 
higher level hierarchy. The 'system as a whole' was made up of 
a very large number of such miniature cooperatives each acting 
on its own. Indeed because of the very small size of even the 
largest farm unit excessive centralisation would have been 
counter-productive. 
3) The system of work sharing by households which Fei described 
was operated in an irrigated plain and the crop was wet rice grown 
in permanent paddy fields, yet it is strikingly similar to one which 
I observed in the Kachin hills in Northern Burma where it was 
used to organise labour in dry hillside, slash and burn cultivation. 
Here then is a specific case in which the type of crop and the 
associated technology of farming is quite unrelated to the pattern 
of labour organisation. The system as such has no special links 
with irrigation: it is appropriate to any kind of work which needs 
to be allocated in terms of proportional shares. I will come back 
to this point presently when I discuss the rajakariya system which 
I observed in Sri Lanka. It is also worth noting that the economy 
of Fei's village was not based on a monoculture. The prosperity 
of the villagers derived from their silk worms and mulberry trees. 
You should notice that, as yet, we have not encountered anything 
that could reasonably be labelled 'Feudalism'. The tenant farmers 
of pre-communist China paid rent-cum-tax in cash and in kind 
to their superior landlords; farmers who owned their land paid 
tax direct; they were not tied to any individual superior by any 
species of 'service tenure'. Whatever might be the practical 
difficulties there were no legal constraints which prevented a 
tenant from moving elsewhere. 
But you should also notice that the Szechwan system which 
I first described entailed the diversion and rediversion of a 
substantial river, an operation which would have been quite 
impossible without the intervention of an official who could organise 
a corvee labour force of some thousands of men to do the switching. 
This fits Wittfogel's model. By contrast Fei's localised system 
needed managerial control only at the local village level. Wittfogel 
would presumably have argued that, although the system described 
by Fei was critically dependent upon hydraulic engineering, the 
scale of operations was too small to justify the title 'Hydraulic 
Society'. Yet the total population involved in the 1930s in the 
network of rice growing units throughout the Yangste delta area 
was many millions. So how small is small? How large is large? 
The next species of irrigation system which I observed at first 
hand tVas in an altogether more 'primitive' context among the 
Yami of Bote! Tobago, a small island off Taiwan. These people 
were primarily fishermen but they cultivated taro and sweet 
potatoes. The sweet potatoes were cultivated by shifting cultivation 
techniques; the taro was grown in small fixed fields which were 
supplied with water by an irrigation system of quite unexpected 
sophistication. Unfortunately I did not discover how the main 
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irrigation channels, which in some cases ran for half a mile or 
so, were managed. But I learned enough about the social 
organisation to be sure that the Yami did not allocate any special 
authority to the irrigation manager or indeed to anyone else. This 
provides evidence that the huge irrigation systems of the Ifugao 
of Luzon, which are associated with a rather similar, notably 
individualistic, form of social organisation, are not just a unique 
exception to a general rule. Complex irrigation works requiring 
coordinated control can work without anything resembling a 
centralised bureaucracy let alone a centralised despotism provided 
always that the system of operation does not call for the assembly 
and control of a massive labour force all working simultaneously 
on the same job. Wittfogel's apparent assumption that large scale 
labour teams are an essential feature of any large scale irrigation 
system is a mistake. 
Burma, my next range of ethnographic experience, provides 
another set of variations. 
At the one extreme there were substantial parts of the central 
dry zone where agriculture was hardly possibly without the aid 
of major irrigation works which were originally constructed and 
later maintained by the King. 
It bears on my argument that (i) the system of government 
which prevailed under the Burmese kings was fragmented and 
had a number of features which parallel those of 'classic' European 
Feudalism including the extensive use of marriage alliances to 
support ties of fealty between members of a baronial hierarchy; 
(ii) that some of the Burmese evidence seems to support Wittfogel's 
thesis that control over irrigation leads to political despotism. 
This is paradoxical since in Wittfogel's scheme Hydraulic Society 
and Feudalism are directly antithetical. It seems to me that if 
we stick to the empirical evidence and avoid argument about 
grand scale 'stages of development' then there were parts of 
pre-British Burma which were both Feudal and Hydraulic! 
The following authoritative extract comes from Scott, writing 
around 1900: 
"Until the reign of King Thibaw (that is the last King of 
independent Burma) the irrigation weirs and canals were 
carefully maintained. In old days, in districts such as 
Kyaukse, the rules were very strict. If a breach occurred 
and loss of revenue resulted, a sentence of death could 
be passed on the Wun (governor) of the district. The Wun 
therefore naturally arrqgated to himself powers of life 
and death over the se-gyis and the kan-oks, the men in 
charge of the weirs, canals and reservoirs. The se-gyis 
in turn apparently were not interfered with if they killed 
villagers who shirked working upon the irrigation works 
when called upon to do so". 
[Scott and Hardiman (1900: I (ii): 341)] 
During the early years of the present century, when the British 
20 Feudalism 
were running Burma as a colonial dependency, they expanded 
the central Government's interest in irrigation management in 
all directions. At one time the Government was responsible for 
well over 500 miles of irrigation channels and large numbers of 
reservoirs and weirs. The economic and political weaknesses 
of the present Burmese regime are associated with an ineffective 
maintenance of these major irrigation works. 
Here then is an example of Wittfogel's model of •mammoth 
hydraulic constructions' linked to 'despotism'. 
But in addition to the centrally controlled 'major works' there 
were many small scale pumping systems organised by local 
communities on principles similar to those described by Fei for 
the Yangtze delta area. 
Some of the central dry zone irrigation canals are ancient 
but they do not have any of the complexity that I noted earlier 
for the Szechwan system in China. Nor has there been any long 
term continuity. 
The political regimes of Burma have been quite exceptionally 
unstable ever since the 13th Century when serious history begins. 
During most of this period the area of the map which we now 
know as Burma was a loose federation of petty principalities (mong), 
each ruled over by either a Shan Prince or a Governor appointed 
by the King. In almost every case the principality had at its heart 
a substantial area of irrigated . paddy-land. I do not have any 
information about the extent to which the local princes took a 
managerial interest in the maintenance of the irrigation works 
but it is clear that the wealth of the best managed and most 
influential principalities derived from resources other than paddy 
cultivation. This seems to turn Wittfogel back to front. 
Wittfogel argued that the necessity for centralised control 
of major irrigation works would ensure centralised despotic 
government authority. Empirically there is no such necessity. 
Paddy land for wet rice cultivation provides the basic food supply 
and without an area of such land there can be no focus of political 
authority at all. But rice is not a scarce commodity. Control 
of paddy cultivation does not create a monopoly. It is rather 
that when there is a powerful political regime in control it can 
extend the irrigation system and the associated paddy cultivation 
and this will strengthen its economic base which permits the 
deployment of labour on other more profitable activities. 
lf the regime is weak, irrigation will be neglected and the 
economic problems of the regime will be enhanced but total disaster 
need not necessarily ensue because the local population can then 
turn to alternative forms of agricultural production which are 
always adequate for subsistence purposes. The point l would 
emphasise is that the prosperous area of pre-colonial Burma had 
a trading economy rather than a monoculture economy. 
So finally to Sri Lanka. For the ill-informed, classical Sri 
Lanka, which 'flourished' rather erratically from the 3rd Century 
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B.C. to the 13th Century A.D., might appear to have had many 
of the classical characteristics of an Oriental Despotism based 
on hydraulic control, so again it seems surprising that Wittfogel 
himself never considered this apparently well documented case. 
What is classical about the situation is that although about 
half·of Sri Lanka is a wet zone where the development of agriculture 
might seem to be very easy, Sri Lankan civilisation in fact developed 
in the North Central dry zone where all cultivation is impossible 
without the aid of irrigation. Why? 
The Sri Lankan kings of the great period were the sponsors 
of a great variety of stupendous engineering works directly 
associated with irrigation. Huge reservoirs contained behind vast 
man-made retaining walls; sluice works of titanic dimensions; 
major water ways of marvellous accuracy. The longest is 55 miles 
in length and has an accurate fall of six inches per mile throughout. 
In the period since 1948 the post-colonial governments of Sri Lanka 
have devoted immense sums to the redevelopment of this part 
of the country. Whether this was a rational thing to do from an 
economic point of view is a moot point. The motivation was 
political; an appeal to the glories of the historical past. 
World experts were called in to plan these 'new' irrigation 
works. In nearly every case the engineers concerned found that 
their best solution to the problems presented was simply to 
reconstruct one or other of the major works of antiquity. As 
engineers the ancient Sinhalese were superb. But where does 
Oriental Despotism come in? 
At the present time all agriculture in the North Central province 
requires irrigation works of one sort or another and ever since 
·the middle of the last century the Government has had a hand 
in the management of irrigation right down to village level. But 
most of the villages concerned either have a separate tank 
(reservoir) or are grouped in a chain with just two or three other 
small villages. Except in the case of the recently developed 
agricultural colonies, which are the artificial products of Central 
Government planning, there are only a minority of settlements 
which can draw water from one of the major engineering 
constructions to which I have referred. This was also the case 
in the past. 
It would seem that in classical times most of the really major 
irrigation works were originally designed as works of conspicuous 
consumption rather than for their strict utility. Their main role 
was to provide fresh water lakes and pleasure gardens for the 
vicinity of the capital cities of Anuradhapura and Pollonaruwa. 
Some of the water channels would have been useful for transport 
purposes. Their irrigation role was certainly not negligible but 
the villages had alternative sources of supply. The major works 
would have improved the reliability of the water supply but they 
were not usually essential. 
In the chronicles of praise that were addressed to past kings 
22 Feudalism 
the creation of huge tanks is put on a par with the erection of 
temples as a source of merit-earning, but, as far as I know, we 
have no satisfactory evidencP. about how the major irrigation 
works were managed in classical times. Their construction was 
probably cumulative over long periods of time but even so must 
have called for the coercive control of a large labour force every 
dry season. So there must have been a government bureaucracy 
of some sort controlling the·- construction of major works. But 
maintenance is another matter. Maintenance of irrigation works 
was one, but only one, of a variety of feudal type service tenures 
covered by the term rajakariya ('king's work'). 
During the pre-colonial era rajakariya was, in general, a duty 
associated with the service tenure of land and linked to a wide 
variety of elaborately differentiated caste duties. The obligatory 
element of most (but not aU) of these duties was formally abolished 
by the British in 1832. The obligations in question have analogies 
in the records of European feudalism but I now consider that it 
is misleading to describe this Sri Lankan system as feudal. 
The circumstances of the 1832 reform were that during the 
18th Century the Dutch colonial authorities had converted caste 
obligations into a corvee duty arbitrarily imposed by the State. 
In 1801 the British had proposed to replace the service tenure 
of land by a Grain Tax. In practice they imposed the Grain Tax 
but their caste based corvee demands became even more onerous. 
The 1832 legislation was supposed to eliminate these abuses. 
But what is relevant for my present purposes is that although 
the various unpaid caste services, such as forced labour in the 
cinnamon plantations, were abolished, one form of rajakariya 
survived and was still being legally enforced in the 1950s. This 
was a duty falling on every householder in a paddy farming village 
to give his proper share of labour to the annual repair and 
maintenance of the village tank and its sluices. By proper share 
was meant "in proportion to the amount of water that each 
shareholder would use". This applied to all tanks, not just major 
tanks linked to the centralised system. 
The land irrigated by the tank was precisely marked out into 
shares and sub-shares (pangu) the extent of which was exactly 
known and measured. The water flowing on to each such share 
of land was also precisely measured and each householder was 
responsible for a sector of the tank retaining wall which was 
precisely proportional in length to the 'share' of land which he 
owned. In pre-Colonial days all the service duties covered by 
the term rajakariya seem to have had this same characteristic. 
The obligation imposed on the householder was proportional to 
the amount of water he was entitled to extract from the tank 
for irrigation purposes. Furthermore during the pre-colonial era 
the caste services involved were not, in most cases, due to the 
State as such but to a local district overlord. This comes close 
to Feudalism in the European sense. Michael Roberts rejects 
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the terminology. I am not now prepared to defend it. 
Until the British introduced a more centralised system in 1855 
responsibility for seeing that the tanks were properly maintained 
and managed seems to have lain with village elders rather than 
outside government officials. Of course things may have been 
different in more ancient times, but I see no reason to suppose 
that they' were.···· In the feudal hierarchy, [and I call it 'feudal' 
simply for want of any better term] service obligations were not 
imposed on particular individuals but on particular villages. The 
fiefdom included both the land and the people living on it. There 
was a presumption that all members of any one village would 
be of the same caste. It was then up to the villagers themselves 
to decide just how particular caste duties were to be allocated 
as between individual householders. The late Roman coloni 
described in John Pryor's symposium contribution were perhaps 
similar though certainly not identical. 
We do not really know how the classical Sinhalese kingdom 
worked. The documents that have come down to us are mostly 
propaganda originating from priestly sources. The record provided 
by the 17th Century English sea-captain Robert Knox is unreliable 
for other reasons. By that time the political centre of gravity 
of independent Sri Lanka had moved to Kandy which is outside 
the dry zone. For what it is worth the regime that Knox describes 
is feudal rather than centralised though the King is certainly 
represented as a despotic tyrant. His construction of waterways 
and pleasure gardens is presented as evidence for that tyranny. 
But Knox wrote with European models in mind. By that time 
Sri Lanka was certainly not an Hydraulic Society in Wittfogel's 
sense. My own view is that Wittfogel's model could never have 
fitted the facts on the ground at aU· closely, though the arithmetical 
precision of the labour sharing conventions, even at village level, 
suggests that at some stage a centralised bureaucracy must have 
been involved right down to the grass roots of the production 
process. 
And that perhaps is the central point of my present argument. 
In Wittfogel the concepts of Oriental Despotism and Hydraulic 
Society are directly associated and by that token the concepts 
of Feudalism and Hydraulic Society are fundamentally distinct. 
But in the empirical cases which I have considered this distinction 
hardly seems to make any sense. 
The concept of Hydraulic Society, considered as an ideal type, 
seems to presuppose a system of monoculture. It is assumed that 
all production is dependent on irrigated agriculture: all irrigated 
agriculture is dependent on a centrally controlled unified system 
of irrigation. But in empirical situations, even where large scale, 
State controlled, irrigation systems exist, they represent only 
one of several alternative modes of agricultural production. 
Contrary to Wittfogel's theory, State control of the water 
supply does not ordinarily provide the associated bureaucracy 
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with an unchallengable source of political power. In any case 
the work force which maintains the irrigation system is not a 
private army whose members are at the beck and call of the 
manager turned despot. On the contrary, except in special 
situations, the day to day management and maintenance of these 
systems is in the hands of local farmers and they allocate the 
labour obligations involved among themselves on some kind of 
cooperative fair shares basis. There is not much to choose between 
the exploitation which such local farmers will suffer in a centralised 
bureaucratic despotism and that which derives from a hierarchy 
of subsidiary 'feudal' barons. 
In my conference presentation I concluded my opening address 
with the following three generalisations. Eight months later, 
after due reflection, they still seem to be worth making: 
(i) If we use Feudalism as Bloch used it to mean no more and 
no less than Mediaeval Western European Society considered as 
a totality then the term Feudalism is redundant and we cannot 
compare European Feudalism with Asiatic Feudalism. 
(ii) Western Mediaeval Society had many components and some 
of these components had their analogies in Asiatic societies. 
Cross-cultural comparison between 'aspects' of European Feudalism 
and 'aspects' of Asian societies may then prove illuminating. 
(iii) Hydraulic engineering was a feature of many pre-colonial 
Asiatic societies. Some featurt?s of some of these 'hydraulic 
societies' had close analogies in some Western European Mediaeval 
societies. If we use such features as markers of 'Feudalism' then 
the distinction between feudalism and hydraulic society becomes 
blurred. That does not matter. But you need to be clear in your 
own minds as to whether you are discussing empirical facts, or 
models in the mind, or simply political slogans. 
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